What Might War with China Over Taiwan Look Like?
An article by Brian Berlectic is worth mentioning. Brian is based in Thailand and is ex-military and has quite a bit to say on the Russia-Ukraine war , much of which makes a lot of sense
https://m.journal-neo.org/2023/04/12/taiwan-pushed-closer-to-conflict-by-washington/
He is a bit of a Sinophile on his discussions relating to Taiwan and China although I think he nails the military reality relating to a potential conflict with China.
Here is a link to his You Tube Channel
He is absolutely wrong about Taiwan being part of China, it never has been except briefly and superfluously in late 1800’s and even then most of the Island was beyond their control as they were inhabited by head hunting aborigines who resided in the mountains and on the East Coast.
The Taiwan people are ethnic Chinese with a common language but culturally are not that close and the vast majority consider themselves Taiwanese and independent, even if this is not recognized officially, even the US and Taiwans own constitution written by KMT from China after they came over following the Civil War.
After the Civil War Taiwan was ruled by the KMT instead of Japan for the next 40 years. During this time you were wither Taiwanese or a Mainlander. Ethnically speaking, all but the few remaining native aborigines were from the Mainland, but the Mainlanders were those who came to Taiwan as the Japanese vacated and after the Civil War ended in defeat for the KMT, thanks to elements in the CFR controlled State Department and some in the Military who preferred Mao’s CCP to win and delayed aid and arms to the KMT Army while Stalin was arming Mao. This is beyond the scope of todays post though.
Here is an extract from his article
The US government and arms industry-funded policy think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published a paper earlier this year titled, “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.”
Here is the paper
Before going on with Brians article I will show the recap of Results from the Study
The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy and air force in the first hours of hostilities.
Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island.
Tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian roll- on, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.
However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland.
Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result:
Taiwan remains autonomous.
There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.
This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position for many years.
While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services.
China also suffers heavily. Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war.
Back to Brian
In it, CSIS argues:
China’s leaders have become increasingly strident about unifying Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China. Senior US officials and civilian experts alike have expressed concern about Chinese intentions and the possibility of conflict.
Although Chinese plans are unclear, a military invasion is not out of the question and would constitute China’s most dangerous solution to its “Taiwan problem”; it has therefore become a focus of US national security discourse.
And by “a focus of US national security discourse,” CSIS is referring to both the open planning and actual military preparations underway for a potential war with China over Taiwan despite official US policy regarding Taiwan having already long-since solved China’s “Taiwan problem.”
It is unofficial US policy supporting separatism on Taiwan, part of a broader strategy to encircle and contain China, that is creating and increasing “the possibility of conflict.”
Just as the US is fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian, US policy papers reveal a similar strategy being prepared regarding Taiwan.
The CSIS paper admits that the cost of preserving Taiwan’s political autonomy would likely be vast levels of death and destruction including infrastructure and industry on the island of Taiwan.
The paper at times infers this is inevitable and owed to Chinese military actions, however, in other parts of the paper it’s admitted that the US itself would deliberately destroy Taiwan’s infrastructure in a bid to deny its use by the PRC and China’s armed forces.
The paper notes:
Ports and airfields enable the use of more varied ships and aircraft to accelerate the transport of troops ashore. The United States may attack these facilities to deny their use after Chinese capture.
Regarding war games CSIS conducted which were the subject of the paper, it concludes:
In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan.
However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years.
The entire destruction of Taiwan for the sake of maintaining an “autonomous Taiwan” is a familiar theme throughout US foreign policy in general, but also a reoccuring theme regarding Taiwan specifically.
An October 2022 Bloomberg article titled, “Taiwan Tensions Spark New Round of US War-Gaming on Risk to TSMC,” would report:
Contingency planning for a potential assault on Taiwan has been stepped up after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to people familiar with the Biden administration’s deliberations.
The scenarios attach heightened strategic significance to the island’s cutting-edge chip industry, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. In the worst case, they say, the US would consider evacuating Taiwan’s highly skilled chip engineers.
The article also stated:
At the extreme end of the spectrum, some advocate the US make clear to China that it would destroy TSMC facilities if the island was occupied, in an attempt to deter military action or, ultimately, deprive Beijing of the production plants. Such a “scorched-earth strategy” scenario was raised in a paper by two academics that appeared in the November 2021 issue of the US Army War College Quarterly.
And while Washington continuously frames its interference in China’s internal political affairs as championing democracy and freedom, US planners have proposed the use of coercive export controls targeting Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, forcing it to migrate to the United States, transfer technology to American shores, and spend at least as much money in the US as it does on the island province of Taiwan.
It is all done in a bid to reduce and eventually eliminate dependency on Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and allow the US to begin developing a monopoly over associated technologies and processes involved in semiconductor manufacturing.
Bloomberg would report:
Taipei is feeling pressured by Washington on the chip front as attempts are also made to reduce Taiwan’s role in the global supply chain, effectively diminishing what President Tsai Ing-wen has called the island’s “Silicon Shield.”
The paradox was on show during Kamala Harris’s September visit to Asia. Hours before hailing Taiwan’s technological contributions to the “global good,” the vice president touted a new US bill authorizing $50 billion for semiconductor research and manufacturing in America.
“Our dependence on Taiwan for chips is, you know, cut substantially,” Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Sept. 29, when asked at an Atlantic Council event where she saw the US in 10 years. “It’s just like a new dawn.”
In essence, the US is stripping away anything of value from Taiwan that it can ahead of armed conflict US planners are fully aware will scour the surface of the island of all essential industry and infrastructure.
Any infrastructure or industry not destroyed in the fighting will be deliberately targeted by the United States for destruction to deny its use by China.
The majority of people on Taiwan recognize they are being used by the US for its own purposes.
The deal seems to be submit to the US and sacrifice their autonomy for the right to buy billions of dollars of US weapons which will do nothing to deter China or alter the final outcome if China choses to use military force.
And they want TSMC technology to make their own Chips one day. Once they have TSMC up and running in Arizona you can bet many TSMC engineers on Taiwan making the more advanced chips will be flown to the US at the first sign of trouble.
And even without a conflict once America starts competing with Taiwan to produce chips at what point does Taiwan become a strategic competitor. What better way to destroy the competition and blame China for its destruction.
And of course, it is expected a trade agreement will be signed before President Tsai leaves office and god only knows what damage that will cause to Taiwans economy, and it will no doubt not be easily terminated by whomever takes office in 2024
Ideally Taiwan could have played off China and the US for longer. President Ma got too close to China and opened up too fast. After the 2014 Sunflower revolution (same time as Ukraine more serious revolution) he backed off, making way for President Tsai who went all in serving American interests.
China does not have the capability to successfully invade Taiwan. They dont have the landing craft needed. They surely know this. Taiwans terrain makes any landing force sitting ducks. Losses would be tremendous on their side. There is a reason we did not invade Taiwan in WWII, it was too tough.
Last time we had landed Marines on Taiwan was in the late 1800’s before Taiwan was given to Japan . They got their butts kicked by the head hunting aborigines. Of course, they were better equipped in World War II but still didn’t dare try landing on Taiwan.
China could of course blockade Taiwan, just declaring the area a war zone would keep all commercial ships out, and their missile capability likely keeps the US Navy away. We normally don’t like losing ships and sailors .
Most likely they also take out Taiwans energy infrastructure, ports and cross island highways/trains.
I don’t think they will target population centers unless Taiwan does the same. Taiwan is very reliant on imports, even food. No idea what stockpiles they have.
Then I would imagine they wait out Taiwan for a surrender.
Taiwan would then face a choice, surrender and be attacked by the US, or fight on and end up like Ukraine. Of course while Ukrainian citizens could leave for Russia or Poland, or Western Ukraine, there is no place for Taiwan people to go. Its just an Island, and not a very big one when you consider its mostly mountains.
The problem with the CSIS study is it stops with China giving up landing its troops on Taiwan via amphibious assault. China could still continue to attack with missiles and by air and maintain a blockade. It would also no doubt suspend trade with the US which would be extremely disruptive to US and Chinas economy, but China would still have Russia on their side for food and energy imports
At the end of the day, if the CSIS study is correct, Taiwan will be broken. Not having many resources beyond its economy and people, and most of that will be gone, whoever gets Taiwan might not bother to rebuild.
I don’t think this needs to happen.
Just stop poking the Bear, do the diplomatic dance playing US off China and vice versa, and buy time. Who knows, maybe China has a revolution of its own someday. Buying time seems better than the alternative.
Some interesting extracts from the study
POLITICS AND STRATEGY
▪ Clarify war plan assumptions. There is a seeming gap between war plans, which assume prewar deployments to Taiwan and neutral countries, and political realities.
▪ Do not plan on striking the mainland. The National Command Authority might withhold permission because of the grave risks of escalation with a nuclear power.
▪ Recognize the need to continue operations in the face of heavy casualties. In three weeks, the United States will suffer about half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
▪ Move Taiwanese air and naval forces toward asymmetry. Despite rhetoric about adopting a “porcupine strategy,” Taiwan still spends most of its defense budget on expensive ships and aircraft that China will quickly destroy.
DOCTRINE AND POSTURE
▪ Fortify and expand air bases in Japan and Guam. Dispersion and hardening dilute the effects of missile attacks.
▪ Revise U.S. Air Force doctrine and restructure procurement to increase aircraft survivability on the ground. Ninety percent of aircraft losses occurred on the ground.
▪ Do not plan on overflying the Chinese mainland. Chinese air defense is too strong, the targets take a long time to produce operational results, and the air missions around Taiwan take priority.
▪ Recognize the limitations of Marine Littoral Regiments and Army Multi-Domain Task Forces
and cap their numbers. These units are designed to counter China and do provide some value, but political and operational difficulties put limits on their utility.
▪ Avoid crisis deployments that create vulnerabilities. Military doctrine calls for forward deployments to enhance deterrence during a crisis, but these forces make tempting targets.
WEAPONS AND PLATFORMS
▪ Shift to smaller, more survivable ships and develop rescue mechanisms to deal with crippled ships and multiple sinkings. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable, with the United States typically losing two carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants in game iterations.
▪ Prioritize submarines and other undersea platforms. Submarines were able to enter the Chinese defensive zone and wreak havoc with the Chinese fleet, but numbers were inadequate.
▪ Continue development and fielding of hypersonic weapons but recognize that they are niche weapons. Their high cost limits inventories, so they lack the volume needed to counter the immense numbers of Chinese air and naval platforms.
Finally, the project and its recommendations need some caveats. Modeling an invasion does not imply that it is inevitable or even probable. The Chinese leadership might adopt a strategy of diplomatic isolation, gray zone pressure, or economic coercion against Taiwan;
even if China opts for military force, this might take the form of a blockade rather than an outright invasion. However, the risk of invasion is real enough and potentially so destructive that analysis is worthwhile.
Protracted or Episodic Conflict:
Finally, the war might not end after this initial phase but drag on for months or even years. Conflict might be episodic, with periodic ceasefires. This project is called The First Battle of the Next War for a reason. Opening battles, even if seemingly decisive, generally do not end a conflict. Cathal Nolan makes this argument in his monumental study, The Allure of Battle. After looking at the long history of wars, he concludes, “How to win decisively in war is the aspiration of all professional military, and a main subject of concern to those who study war. Yet
it is the single hardest thing to do, to translate combat into achievement of an important strategic and political goal that the other side is forced to recognize and accept when the war is over.”
These losses might cause strategic disillusionment. The United States would sustain as many personnel casualties in a month of such conflict as in 20 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The scale and suddenness of such losses would shock a U.S. population unaccustomed to significant military losses.
The effect might be like the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, where the combination of surprise, betrayal, and loss solidified public opinion and created a determination to press the conflict to its conclusion.
[War is one way to get people behind government. They could easily have mentioned 9/11. Is this what they are contemplating with China because it sure reads like they aren’t planning on Winning the War -should it start]
On the other hand, the effect might be like the 1983 bombing of the U.S. barracks in Beirut, where the U.S. population and political establishment decided that the cost was not worth the foreign policy benefit. The result was withdrawal.
[Sorry Taiwan, but we decided you aren’t worth fighting for any longer, like we did in Vietnam and Afghanistan]
Even if the United States prosecuted the war to a successful conclusion, a narrative of disillusionment might emerge. U.S. policymakers and Americans might question whether the sacrifice had been worth preserving Taiwanese independence and democracy.
That kind of disillusionment occurred after World War I. Even though the United States was successful, with relatively low casualties (at least compared to the other combatants), there was profound disillusionment after the war. Many argued that “merchants of death” had manipulated the United States into the war. This produced a turn toward isolationism.
[Fat chance of that happening. We still had a Democracy then, unlike today where it is only an illusion]
I express only my opinions. Maybe I am wrong. You are welcome to have a different opinion, informed or otherwise.