Musings and News From Taiwan
So with Pelosi long gone and Chinas Exercises over I will recap the last few days with excepts from various news sources and some background stories
Fortunately there were no accidents or false flags triggering an escalation, at least none that have been reported.
Frankly, if not for the news you wouldn’t have known anything was going on beyond the absence of contrails and what seemed like fewer flights going in and out of the airport in Taipei (I can see as ending/descending flights from my apartment).
Is this the end of the Pelosi kerfuffle? Damned if I know. My guess is Xi sits back and gages if he did enough to satisfy his PLA Generals and CCP/CPC hardliners.
Or maybe they want to wait until after their National Holiday on October 1 and give Taiwan a Double 10 surprise (10-10 is Taiwans National Holiday). Other factors in setting an optimum date for any invasion is avoiding the Typhoon Season (ends by November) and waiting until Chinas Peak Export Season (November) is over with.
Furthermore there is high expectation there will be another wave of COVID this fall on both sides of the strait, although this might work out in Chinas favor as their population was spared the ravages of mRNA injections.
Hopefully nothing at all happens. I think its very likely China does not have the capability for a full amphibious landing invasion and would have to rely on blockade and air assault which could mean a prolonged war giving the US time to mobilize
(I have provided some links and excerpts showing the difficulties).
While they are unlikely to be defeated by the US the costs to China will be enormous and even if Taiwan capitulates the cost to rebuild whats left of Taiwans infrastructure and economy will be enormous.
Assuming thats all, and we are done with it I cant say China has accomplished anything. Many will see China as being all bluff and perhaps be emboldened to take it further. Perhaps Kamala might like to taste Taipei’s cuisine and enjoy their hospitality.
Let us begin
8-4
The MND issued another press release at 5:30 p.m. stating that from 1:56 p.m. to 4 p.m., the PLA launched a total of 11 Dongfeng ballistic missiles into the waters surrounding northern, southern, and eastern Taiwan in several waves.
Footage has appeared on CCTV and Weibo showing the launch of missiles and the alleged locations off the coast of Taiwan where they landed. Maps show missiles landing to the west, northeast, east, and southeast of Taiwan.
Locations of missile hit locations
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4616251
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Taiwan's Maritime and Port Bureau (MPB) on Thursday (Aug. 4) announced that China has added a seventh live-fire zone around Taiwan and that it will be in effect one day longer than the others.
At 10:59 p.m. on Tuesday (Aug. 2), just 15 minutes after Nancy Pelosi's arrival in Taiwan, Chinese state-run mouthpiece the Global Times released an announcement from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) saying it would hold "important military exercises and training activities including live-fire drills" in six areas around Taiwan proper from Aug. 4 to Aug. 7. The PLA has marked vast swaths of waters off the coast of Taiwan, including areas to the northwest, north, northeast, east, southwest, and southeast of the country.
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4616143
Taiwanese military expert Lu Li-shi (呂禮詩) predicts that China could fire missiles over Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung as they head toward one of the six zones the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has designated for live-fire exercises this week.
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4615931
Japan's Kyodo News Agency quoted Kenryo Mori, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Japan, as saying on the 4th that the Japanese government "lodged a strong protest" with the Chinese side through diplomatic channels on the grounds that "five ballistic missiles fired by the Chinese army landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone" on the grounds that "the Chinese army landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone." In addition, Agence France-Presse reported that Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said that "five of the nine ballistic missiles fired by China landed in Japan's exclusive economic zone" and said that "this is the first time such an accident has occurred".
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20220805001117-260409?ctrack=mo_main_headl_p02
The Taipei Flight Information Zone is accessed by 1.7 million commercial jets per year, and the Taiwan Strait is a passage to the South China Sea, through which US$5.3 trillion worth of goods transits annually. The sea route is a lifeline to China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea,” Su said.
“As China has 60 percent of its trade in value traveling by sea, a blockade in the Taiwan Strait would affect China and the globe, and result in higher premiums for war-risk insurance and further disruptions of supply chains. Making it a long-term practice would be difficult,” he said.
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/08/05/2003783014
8-5
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Approximately 10 Chinese naval ships and 20 military aircraft crossed Taiwan's median line on Friday (Aug. 5).
At 11 a.m. the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that multiple People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and naval vessels had been detected taking part in exercises around the Taiwan Strait and crossed the median line. The ministry said that in response to the intrusions, it had employed "alert broadcast, aircraft in CAP, patrolling naval vessels, and land-based missile systems."
The MND said that regardless of whether the PLA's military exercises involve launching ballistic missiles or deliberately crossing the median line of the strait, they are all "highly provocative acts." It added the country's armed forces will adhere to the principle of "prepare for war, but do not seek it" and an attitude of "not escalating conflict or causing disputes."
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4617259
8-5
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — On Friday (Aug. 5), the second day of China's live-fire drills launched around Taiwan, seven U.S. reconnaissance planes, including a U-2, and six tankers were detected flying in the vicinity of Taiwan.
Beijing-based think-tank, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), tweeted that one U.S. Air Force (USAF) Boeing RC-135S Cobra Ball measurement and signature intelligence aircraft, one USAF RC-135V Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft, three U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, one USAF Boeing E-3G Sentry airborne early warning and control aircraft, and one Lockheed U-2S high altitude reconnaissance aircraft, were in flight near Taiwan.
The Chinese think-tank also reported the presence of six Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers. On the SCSPI's map, the reconnaissance aircraft could be seen in the north, northeast, east, southeast, and south of Taiwan at varying distances and headings.
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4617283
The first stage is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) already having engaged in live fire drills, with massive shelling in the direction of the Taiwan Strait out of Fujian province.
The first sanctions are on too, against two Taiwanese funds. Export of sable to Taiwan is forbidden; sable is an essential commodity for the electronics industry – so that will ratchet up the pain dial in high-tech sectors of the global economy.
Chinese CATL, the world’s largest fuel cell and lithium-ion battery maker, is indefinitely postponing the building of a massive $5 billion, 10,000-employee factory that would manufacture batteries for electric vehicles across North America, supplying Tesla and Ford among others.
So the Sun Tzu maneuvering ahead will essentially concentrate on a progressive economic blockade of Taiwan, the imposition of a partial no-fly zone, severe restrictions of maritime traffic, cyber warfare, and the Big Prize: inflicting pain on the US economy.
https://www.unz.com/pescobar/how-a-missile-in-kabul-connects-to-a-speaker-in-taipei/
Pelosi said: “This is something that opens the doors for us for better economic exchanges. Several Taiwanese companies are already planning to invest in chip manufacturing in the US. The entrepreneurial spirit, the intellectual resources and the success of the tech industry in Taiwan has really been a model... With the CHIPS act, we are facilitating to reach our shared goal of increasing our partnership.”
Pelosi said that “a trade agreement might be possible and could occur soon,” without giving any details.
Pelosi yesterday also visited the Legislative Yuan and held a closed-door meeting with Deputy Legislative Speaker Tsai Chi-chang (蔡其昌) and the legislative caucus whips of four political parties.
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/08/04/2003782949
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) met with several of Taiwan's chip industry leaders during her visit to Taipei on Tuesday to promote closer commercial ties between the two countries following the House's passage of legislation funding new chip production capabilities in the United States.
Pelosi met with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. Chairman Mark Liu during the visit, according to senior lawmakers in Taiwan. The pair discussed the CHIPS Act, which the House passed last week and sent to President Joe Biden to sign into law.
The bill would provide hundreds of billions of dollars to fund U.S. innovation. The legislation includes a $52 billion subsidy for chipmakers like Intel in hopes of weaning off a total reliance on Taiwan for semiconductors.
The House Speaker praised the passage of CHIPS as "a great opportunity for U.S.-Taiwan economic cooperation" during a lunch with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen.
"We just passed the CHIPS and Science Act. That is something that opens the door for us to have better economic exchanges. ... The entrepreneur spirit, the brain power, and the intellectual resources that exist in Taiwan — and the success of the tech industry here — has really been a model, and we want to increase our relationship," Pelosi added.
Pelosi met with several other industry officials during her time in Taiwan, including a visit with TSMC founder Morris Chang during a lunch with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen.
Taiwan has maintained control of the semiconductor markets for several years. The country currently controls 48% of the world's semiconductor foundries and 61% of the ability to build the more advanced 16nm chips, according to data released by TrendForce. However, the country's leading semiconductor foundry, TSMC, has struggled to keep up with demand, leading to the current shortage of semiconductors across the world.
Its problems have also created security concerns. U.S. officials have been concerned about the national security threats that a China-controlled semiconductor market would have on future military operations. This, in part, led to legislators such as Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) seeking to pass the CHIPS Act, which would help build additional foundries in the United States and help the country wean off of total reliance on China and Taiwan.
TSMC finished constructing a $12 billion plant in Arizona to expand its efforts outside of Taiwan. The plant is expected to begin operations in 2024.
The House voted 243-187 in favor of the legislation on July 28, a vote complicated by GOP anger over Senate Democrats unveiling a surprise agreement on significant climate and healthcare legislation meant to pass without Republican votes.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) had said that Republicans would block the semiconductor legislation if Democrats threatened to pass the partisan climate and healthcare spending bill.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/technology/pelosi-semiconductor-leaders-taiwan-chips-act
[I don’t know if Taiwan has thought this through. By transferring some of TSMC production and know how to the US and helping Pelosi push a bill that aids US companies like Intel and others to compete with TSMC, then Taiwans value to US will diminish. Indeed, misfortune to TSMC on Taiwan due to War will enhance the value of US based Chip Makers
And beware that Trade Agreement. We tend to use such Agreements to weaken countries sovereignty and usurp the Democratic protections of its citizens in favor of US Corporations]
Last year, TSMC announced plans to pump $100bn into expanding the manufacturing capacity at its factories over three years in response to the chip shortage. This includes a facility it is building in the US state of Arizona.
Semiconductors are used in everything from computer and cars to coffee machines, and a global shortage has meant that many of these products are in short supply. Some US tech executives have argued a steady domestic supply of chips are crucial to advances in technology.
However, the CHIPS and Science Act restricts companies that get US federal funding from increasing advanced chip production in China, a move that impacts big chip players such as Intel and TSMC and further escalates tensions between two of the world’s most powerful countries.
Bloomberg reported that the condition in the act means that TSMC, which provides customers such as Apple with its tech, won’t be able to substantially upgrade or expand its existing operations in China and may lose out on growth opportunities in the world’s biggest chip market.
The move has also prompted leading Korean chipmakers Samsung and SK Hynix to reconsider their investments in China, according to sources who spoke to the Financial Times. “If China is unhappy, they will have to take it up with the US,” a senior Korean official told the outlet.
In 2020, TSMC responded to pressure from US government to cut ties with Chinese company Huawei, which at the time was one of its most important customers after Apple.
https://www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/why-is-nancy-pelosi-visiting-taiwan-chips-act-tsmc
[I am all for reducing our dependence on China. I am also aware that doing so makes War with China more attractive. Its a bit of a double edge sword that Taiwan who would be caught in the middle should consider]
CHIPS and Science Act as an example of a seemingly well-intended policy that will produce bad outcomes. (CHIPS is an acronym for Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors.)
The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 64-33 on July 27; the House passed it the next day, 243-187. The legislation was set to be signed into law Tuesday by President Joe Biden.
The measure aims to boost American semiconductor chip manufacturers and combat the threat China poses to America’s national security. Roberts said he views the Chinese Communist Party as a greater threat than the former Soviet Union was.
But the CHIPS and Science Act, Heritage’s president argued, simply would line the pockets of corporations that are its beneficiaries.
“These chip companies, making tens of billions of dollars, don’t need our money,” Roberts said.
As Roberts noted in a July 22 statement:
The answer to the [Chinese Communist Party’s] malevolent ambitions is not spending billions of dollars to help Fortune 500 companies, with no guarantee those dollars won’t end up supporting these companies’ business operations in China.
Additionally, the act’s [$280] billion price tag will contribute to record inflation and increase the already historic cost of living for working and middle-class Americans.
https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/08/02/chips-act-an-example-of-misguided-public-policy-heritage-foundation-president-says/
The U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity has decreased from 37% in 1990 to 12% today, largely because other governments have offered manufacturing incentives and invested in research to strengthen domestic chipmaking capabilities, according to a state of the industry report by the Semiconductor Industry Association.
Now China accounts for 24% of the world's semiconductor production, followed by Taiwan at 21%, South Korea at 19% and Japan at 13%, the report said.
With the CHIPS Act, the administration hopes to bring as much semiconductor manufacturing to the U.S. as practically possible, said Bonnie Glick, director of the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue University.
"And what can't be reasonably onshore, either because it's cost prohibitive or other allied countries simply do it better, we can ally-shore manufacturing and support that," she told VOA.
The two allies the administration has leveraged are South Korea and Japan, both of which Biden visited in May. In Seoul, he toured a Samsung computer chip factory that is the model for a $17 billion facility that the South Korean technology giant is setting up in the U.S. state of Texas.
Last week, the U.S. and Japan launched a new joint international semiconductor research hub under a "bilateral chip technology partnership" to bolster manufacturing for 2-nanometer chips as early as 2025.
Washington has also persuaded Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd. (TSMC) to open a U.S. foundry to produce advanced semiconductors. The $12 billion facility in the state of Arizona was completed last month and is scheduled to start production of 5 nm chips by 2024. TMSC also has plants in China.
"We're back in the game," Biden said Tuesday. "Remember, we invented these chips, we modernized these chips, we made them work, and there's a lot more we can get done."
The CHIPS Act has laid out a clear strategy for Washington, said Volker Sorger, Professor at the George Washington University and co-founder of Optelligence Company.
"Gain autonomy and eliminate political dependencies on these global supply chain values," Sorger told VOA.
That strategy puts the U.S. on a collision course with China, which also aims to be the global leader in semiconductors. In 2015, Beijing launched the Made in China 2025 project, which aimed to increase chip production from less than 10% of global demand at the time to 40% in 2020 and 70% in 2025.
The Made in China 2025 program and the People's Liberation Army’s goal of military-civil fusion make it "overtly clear that Beijing is seeking to dominate global technology and supply chains through anti-competitive trade practices and infiltration of dual-use technology research," Glick said.
The U.S. government has been pushing for stricter export regulations to China by prohibiting export of equipment needed for manufacturing chips at 14 nm and below. "That would mark an escalation from the previous ban covering 10 nm and below," Glick added.
Taiwan's strategic importance
Taiwan — a self-governed island that Beijing claims to be its breakaway province — lies at the heart of the increasingly tense U.S.-China rivalry.
Taipei has dominated manufacture of the world's most high-tech chips, accounting for 92% of the global production of 10 nm or smaller semiconductors, essentially creating what some observers have characterized as a "silicon shield" that ensures American support in the event of a Chinese attack, as well as a deterrence to such a move.
A military conflict over Taiwan could disrupt TMSC's semiconductor production and have disastrous effects on global manufacturing.
U.S.-China tensions are already spooking technology investors. TSMC shares fell nearly 3% on Tuesday as U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi landed in Taipei in a visit she said demonstrated American solidarity with the Taiwanese people.
Beijing has condemned the visit, the first by a U.S. House speaker in 25 years, as a threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Rare earths
The CHIPS Act does not include provisions to secure supply chains of rare earths — and other critical minerals used in semiconductors and other high-tech elements — to reduce the nation's dependence on China, a major producer of these elements.
"I don't know that we have developed a coherent strategy on accessing both rare and nonrare elements," Glick said.
Last June, following Biden's executive order to improve supply chains, the administration released a report concluding that the U.S. was overly reliant on China for critical minerals. Currently, China controls 87% of the global permanent magnet market, 55% of rare earths mining capacity and 85% of rare earths refining.
Earlier this year, the administration announced actions it said would bolster the supply chain of these elements, including a contract for U.S. company MP Materials to process heavy rare earth elements at its California production site — the first processing and separation facility of its kind in the nation.
https://www.voanews.com/a/biden-celebrates-semiconductor-legislation-to-boost-us-competitiveness-against-china/6684892.html
8-6
Meanwhile, The Guardian notes that a high level Taiwanese official has died. "News about the drills came as Taiwan’s official media outlet, CNA, reported Ou Yang Li-hsing, the vice-president of the Taiwan defence ministry’s research and development unit, had been found dead in a hotel room after a heart attack," the report said, and noted, "there were no signs of intrusion to the 57-year-old’s room and that his family said he had a history of cardiac problems."
https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/taiwan-says-chinas-drills-are-simulating-full-attack-island
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — A top military official overseeing Taiwan's missile production has died from a heart attack in southern Taiwan during a business trip.
Serving as the deputy to the president of the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) since March, Ouyang Li-hsing (歐陽力行) was responsible for supervising the manufacturing of all types of missiles.
The 57-year-old military professional fell ill and was discovered by his aide at a hotel in Pingtung on Saturday morning (Aug. 6) after a no-show for a cultural event. Surveillance video from the hotel shows Ouyang had been alone since checking-in the preceding evening
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4618248
Also in Pingtung
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Two men were killed in Pingtung County after a light aircraft crashed on Saturday (Aug. 6).
CNA reported that the deceased have been identified as 61-year-old Chu (朱) and his 27-year-old son. The cause of the crash has yet to be determined.
[I never even knew Taiwan allowed private aircraft-very strange. ]
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4618625
An air and sea blockade would hit Taiwan hard. Some 40% of its electricity is generated by natural gas all of which it has to import. Another large part is produced with coal which Taiwan also imports. The same goes for petroleum products. Before Pelosi landed in Taipei gas reserves on the island were enough for just 11 days. Coal and oil is easier to store but would still run out before a blockade could be lifted.
Then there is food:
In 2018, Taiwan's food self-sufficiency rate is only 35%. Additionally, the actual production of agricultural land in Taiwan is about 520,000 hectares, which is far from the 740,000 to 810,000 hectares’ target prescribed by the Ministry of Interior. As an island nation, food supply depends on international trade and is regarded as dangerous.
A total blockade of Taiwan would likely bring it to its knees within a few weeks or months. Time that could be used to defeat its air force, air defenses and missiles and prevent attacks from Taiwan on China's continental assets. China does not have to invade the island. It just has to wait until it is invited to come in.
In a response to a Chinese blockade of Taiwan the U.S. would likely declare a blockade of China from energy imports, i.e. oil and LPG. It could enforce this by hindering Chinese ships from passing through the Malacca Street and other maritime bottlenecks. (The second big gas pipeline that Russia is currently building to China is one of the counter moves to that threat.)
In case of a blockade and counter-blockade the question becomes who could hold out longer. Here China has the advantage of greater reserves. The U.S. would also have only few allies in such a conflict. China would, like Russia is now, still be in good standing with the rest of the world. That would allow it to mitigate most consequences.
One of the exclusion zones spans 800 square miles in the Taiwan Strait between the island's northwestern coast and Pingtan Island, which is just off mainland China.
At 10am UTC (universal time) on 29 July, around 17 vessels are visible in the area. Most of them are carrier ships or tankers travelling through the well-trodden trade route.
But move the white button on the image above and you can see that at the same time on 4 August, eight hours after the military exercises began, the area is empty.
"Vessels will have to sail alternative and longer routes to go to Taiwanese ports and some vessels have apparently already decided to sail east of Taiwan instead of sailing through the strait," said Mr Rasmussen.
Another exclusion area is situated just 15 nautical miles from the entrance to one of Taiwan's major ports, Kaohsiung.
On 30 July, at least 30 vessels were in the region. The port can be seen close by, where many ships appear to be gathered.
But at the same time on 5 August, the number of ships is far fewer and just one vessel appears to be on the perimeter.
However, Lloyd's List Intelligence reports that there has been no reduction in port calls nor has there been any further reports of disruption to ports in Taiwan.
The impact is largely being felt through detours around Taiwan's eastern coast, which analysts say are inconvenient but manageable.
"Delays are obviously never good and especially not for a supply chain that has been riddled with delays for a long time," said Mr Rasmussen.
"That said, if the exercise ends on Sunday with no incident it will only be a small share of the world's fleet that has been delayed by a relatively small amount.
I found this rather interesting timeline of Taiwan-China relations from the Office of the Historian which is Directed by the Dept of State
Chronology of U.S.-China Relations, 1784-2000
https://history.state.gov/countries/issues/china-us-relations
This from the CFR which goes to 2022
U.S. Relations With China
1949 – 2022
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-china
2021-TAIPEI, TAIWAN —
The United States has doubled its unofficial military presence in Taiwan over the past year in what specialists describe as the latest signal to China that Taiwan's future remains a priority.
The increase from 20 personnel to 39 between December 31 and September 30 came with little fanfare, but it did coincide with a rare public acknowledgement by President Tsai Ing-wen in October that the U.S. military maintains a small presence in Taiwan.
Active-duty deployments now include 29 Marines as well as two service members from the Army, three from the Navy and five from the Air Force, according to the Pentagon's Defense Manpower Data Center.
While the United States has not disclosed what the military personnel are doing, at the very least it is sending a strong signal to China, said Kitsch Liao, military and cyber affairs consultant for DoubleThink Lab, a Taiwan-based research organization specializing in disinformation.
"The escalation is subtle but unmistakable," he told VOA.
The local balance of forces in East Asia continues to tip ever more in favor of the PLA. Taiwanese forces have been unable to keep up with the rapid growth and modernization of the PLA and have prioritized “prestige” military capability over the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that would be more effective defending the island against the PLA.
Because of this, Taiwanese forces, while certainly still capable, are increasingly at risk of having to face PLA overmatch in quantity but also in quality. These changes in Taiwan’s threat environment particularly the ambiguous nature of U.S. support and relative changes in the balance of forces are pushing Taiwanese leaders to alter their defensive strategy.
Perhaps more importantly in the overall balance, U.S. forces no longer boast the overmatch that they enjoyed during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Unconstrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the PLA amassed hundreds of thousands of conventional ballistic missiles that now threaten U.S. ships and bases in Japan, Korea, and even Guam. During the same period the United States lost its bases in the Philippines—critical locations near China and on the South China Sea.
The risk to the remaining bases and ships, especially to runways and aircraft carriers, is that China could swiftly neutralize American air and naval power in East Asia during a conflict. This would effectively prevent the United States from interfering with a PLA invasion of Taiwan because the United States does not have any forces in Taiwan.
A 2017 report by the Center for New American Security found that Chinese missiles were “the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia.”
By marrying great accuracy with numerous ballistic missiles, China may have developed a capability that the Soviet armed forces never had: the ability to strike effectively, in a matter of minutes, U.S. and allied bases, logistical facilities, and command centers without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, and without having established air superiority.
Later in the year, a RAND research brief came to the same conclusion—that U.S. presence in the region was vulnerable because of the Chinese capability to target U.S. bases, specifically aviation infrastructure, which could be neutralized for at least the first forty days of a conflict—more than enough time for the PLA to gain a foothold in Taiwan.
Michael Chase’s 2018 testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reported on the modernization of PLA capabilities and found that
[the PLA] Rocket Force’s growing conventional ballistic and cruise missile capabilities could pose a serious threat to U.S. forces and those of its allies and partners, including not only fixed facilities such as air bases but also surface ships, such as U.S. aircraft carriers.
Another analyst called the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, a “sitting duck susceptible to missile attacks from the Chinese.”
It would also be difficult and risky, if not impossible for the United States to surge forces to Taiwan to support the Taiwanese military in the event of a conflict. PLA A2/AD capabilities could easily seal off Taiwan to even the expeditionary forces on the United States bases in Japan and Guam. Surge forces from the U.S. mainland would be weeks if not months away.
In Taiwan’s case, it is helpful to break deterrence down into two components: the perceived ability to prevent a PLA invasion (often called denial) and the perceived ability to effectively respond to one with force and fight a larger conflict.
The distinction is important because it is now likely that the United States has little or no ability to prevent such an action. Chinese missiles and missile-armed bombers could, with little or no warning, cripple the U.S. aviation support infrastructure in East Asia and neutralize flat-deck Navy vessels in the opening hours of a conflict. By targeting runways, China could prevent the United States from bringing other aircraft into theater, and China could use its considerable number of surface ships and submarines to prevent or delay the arrival of out-of-theater U.S. naval assets.
The United States would still retain a long-range bomber force capable of striking PLA targets and probably submarine assets capable of striking targets on land and at sea. However, unsupported, these assets would be vulnerable to Chinese fighter aircraft and antisubmarine warfare efforts, respectively. A surprise PLA attack on U.S. forces and Taiwan could effectively isolate Taiwan from U.S. support and prevent U.S. interference in a cross-strait invasion for days, if not weeks.
A RAND study found that with only 274 missiles (a small fraction of the PLA inventory), the PLA could keep Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa close to fighter operations for thirty days and three times as long for tanker operations. This would be adequate time for the PLA to gain a foothold in Taiwan and expand its air defense umbrella across the strait.
Similarly, a more limited PLA strategy of blockade or an extended air and missile campaign would effectively preclude U.S. forces from defending Taiwan later.
The second component of deterrence, the ability to react, now becomes important. The United States would be faced with the choice of acquiescing to the PLA invasion of Taiwan, a near fait accompli at this point, or marshaling forces to attempt a much larger and longer campaign to roll back the PLA A2/AD umbrella and ultimately land forces on Taiwan to reinforce the Taiwanese military or retake the island.
Because the United States is reacting and could have been isolated from providing immediate support to Taiwan, the decision to intervene and support Taiwan becomes a deliberate rather than reflexive choice.
American leadership and the public may, at that juncture, decide that the sovereignty of Taiwan is not worth the cost of that larger campaign and a potentially much larger war with Beijing.
In his 2013 essay on deterrence, Richard K. Betts argued that the political will to support Taiwan militarily in a crisis was an open question.
There is no serious discussion about this, let alone consensus, among either U.S. voters or the foreign policy elite in Washington.
The presence of U.S. ground forces in Taiwan would significantly alter the deterrence paradigm and prevent Mearsheimer’s blitzkrieg and fait accompli attacks or any misunderstanding of the United States’ intentions. Forces in Taiwan would also communicate the message the United States will defend Taiwan in the clearest terms, in Schelling’s words this communication is the “hardest part of deterrence.
It is critical to recognize that basing U.S. forces in Taiwan would likely be considered an escalatory move by the People’s Republic of China and that such a move would likely have other impacts in U.S. foreign policy beyond Taiwan. The full range of potential consequences of this decision are beyond the scope of this paper but would need to be thoroughly considered.
Any U.S. forces in Taiwan would also have require an invitation by the Taiwanese government, something likely to provoke significant internal debate in Taiwan. On the other hand, the loss of Taiwan as a friendly nation would throw the larger U.S. military strategies for defending Japan or the Philippines into disarray; control of Taiwan would give the PLA unfettered access to the Pacific Ocean and break any defensive strategy centered on the First Island Chain.
China’s A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a long war. However, provided the United States is nonetheless willing to fight, China cannot expect to win militarily. Thus, the two could face the prospect of an extremely costly military standoff.
This outcome implies that a conflict could be decided by domestic political, international, and, especially, economic factors, all of which would favor the United States in a long, severe war:
• Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China’s would be far worse (perhaps 25–35 percent of GDP after one year). Because much of the Western Pacific would become a war zone, China’s trade with the region and the rest of the world would decline substantially. China’s loss of seaborne energy sup- plies would be especially damaging.
Although consumption is a smaller share of the Chinese economy than the U.S. economy, it is expected to grow, leaving the Chinese economy vulnerable to further contraction in the event of war.
• Politically, a long conflict, especially if militarily severe and eco- nomically punishing, could expose China to internal division— taxing and testing the state.
• The entry of Japan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. partners in the region could have a considerable influence on military opera- tions. The responses of Russia, India, and NATO are less impor- tant. However, NATO efforts to preserve security in other regions (at least Europe, if not also the Middle East) would permit greater, or less risky, commitment of U.S. forces to war with China.
Such a combination of international responses could increase Chinese losses in a long, severe conflict, despite improved A2AD.
In a nutshell, despite military trends that favor it, China could not win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025, especially if prolonged. Moreover, the economic costs and political dangers of such a war could imperil China’s stability, end its development, and undermine the legitimacy of the state.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pdf
Russia has completed delivery of the second regimental set of Russian-made S-400 Triumf long-range interceptor-based air defense systems (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) destined for service in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), according to a Russian military diplomatic source.
“Delivery of a second S-400 regimental set (…) has been completed,” the source was quoted as saying by TASS news agency on January 27. The source also pointed out that a S-400 handover certificate was reportedly signed in China in December 2019. “The client also received more than 120 advanced anti-aircraft guided missiles of two types,” the source added without specifying the missile types.
Notably, the United States imposed sanctions in September 2018 on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Equipment Development Department (EDD) for the procurement of S-400 air defense systems.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/russia-completes-delivery-of-second-s-400-regiment-to-china/
The rate of ammunition and equipment consumption in Ukraine can only be sustained by a large-scale industrial base.
This reality should be a concrete warning to Western countries, who have scaled down military industrial capacity and sacrificed scale and effectiveness for efficiency. This strategy relies on flawed assumptions about the future of war, and has been influenced by both the bureaucratic culture in Western governments and the legacy of low-intensity conflicts. Currently, the West may not have the industrial capacity to fight a large-scale war.
China’s near monopoly on rare earth materials is an obvious challenge here. Stinger missile production will not be completed until 2026, in part due to component shortages. US reportson the defence industrial base have made it clear that ramping up production in war-time may be challenging, if not impossible, due to supply chain issues and a lack of trained personnel due to the degradation of the US manufacturing base.
Finally, there is an assumption about overall ammunition consumption rates. The US government has always lowballed this number. From the Vietnam era to today, small arms plants have shrunk from five to just one. This was glaring at the height of the Iraq war, when US started to run low on small arms ammunition, causing the US government to buy British and Israeli ammunition during the initial stage of the war. At one point, the US had to dip into Vietnam and even Second World War-era ammo stockpiles of .50 calibre ammunition to feed the war effort.
This was largely the result of incorrect assumptions about how effective US troops would be. Indeed, the Government Accountability Office estimated that it took 250,000 rounds to kill one insurgent.
Luckily for the US, its gun culture ensured that small arms ammunition industry has a civilian component in the US. This is not the case with other types of ammunition, as shown earlier with Javelin and Stinger missiles.
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare
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https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/
The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) that made its public debut at China's National Day parade on October 1 has been identified as a state-of-the-art piece of weaponry capable of firing both rockets and ballistic missiles, according to a leading military magazine.
A report in the latest issue of Modern Ships also gave the new hardware a name — the Type PCL191 — saying it was a modular launcher based on the AR3 system developed by China for the export market.
Unlike other weapon systems on display in Beijing, which had their names emblazoned along their sides, the Type PCL191 rumbled through the streets of Beijing on the back of heavy-duty trucks with almost complete anonymity.
Modern Ships went further, saying the modular rocket system can carry eight 370 mm (14½ inch) rockets — each with a range of 350 km (220 miles) — or two 750 mm Fire Dragon 480 tactical ballistic missiles — each capable of flying up to 500 km
https://www.insider.com/chinas-new-rocket-launcher-system-casting-a-shadow-over-taiwan-2019-12
Foreign intervention is an important factor affecting PLA logistics operations. Analysis in Operational Logistics Support estimates that support for a large-scale landing and on-island operations against Taiwan would last approximately three months. However, U.S. intervention, blockade, and international sanctions and embargo would lead to protracted war. Enemy actions such as information and firepower strikes can disrupt PLA logistics operations, including command and control, interrupting support to operational forces. The threat of precision strikes will necessitate protection and concealment of logistics forces and infrastructure.
Crossing the Taiwan Strait poses great difficulties for the logistics delivery mission. The strait is 220 km wide at the widest point and 130 km at the narrowest point. The tides, waves, currents, winds, weather, beach conditions, and enemy obstacles and defenses pose great challenges to transporting and landing troops and materiel. The logistics support system will support hundreds of thousands of troops implementing blockade, firepower strikes, and landing operations. Embarking, transporting, and unloading the immense force and supplies in an unfavorable natural environment and under enemy attack will present an unprecedentedly complex and arduous task.
Logistics will face changing missions during transitions to new operational stages. These missions include supporting forces during the following operational stages: strategic deployment and assembly of forces and supplies to the coast; seizing air, maritime, and information superiority; joint blockade and fire strike operations; embarkation and maritime transport; landing operations; and on-island operations. Support requirements for the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLARF will be high during all operational stages. Such a large operation will demand all the resources of the PRC and PLA including the People’s Armed Police, militia, and reserves.
PLA theories for assault landing operations are evolving and attempting to catch up with those of more advanced militaries. Vertical landings, over-the-horizon assault landings, and integrated joint landings are changing the PLA’s traditional concept of landing operations. At the same time, PLA theorists estimate that a traditional large-scale landing cannot be replaced in the era of informationized warfare, but rather will be supplemented by airborne, air assault, and over-the- horizon landing methods as these capabilities improve. Evolving concepts for amphibious landings have a significant impact on logistics.
Timelines for logistics support are dramatically compressed. The accelerated landing of combat troops will shorten the timelines for meeting critical logistics requirements during the beach assault and seizing of a landing base. According to Operational Logistics Support, large numbers of high-tech landing equipment such as air cushion vehicles and wing-in-ground effect vehicles conducting over-the-horizon landings can limit the effects of enemy fire strikes. These systems require high maintenance and are vulnerable to enemy fires. Importantly, they are not yet deployed in large numbers.
A higher operational tempo will increase the importance of maintaining command of logistics units and coordination with supported units. This requires a fully integrated command information system and trained command personnel capable of responding to rapidly changing logistics requirements in a dynamic battlefield involving frequent transitions in logistics support and adjustments in the logistics support plan.
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The PLA believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves.
Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies.
Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.
The PLA assesses that even after years of construction in the main strategic direction (i.e., the area facing Taiwan), infrastructure capabilities still faces problems supporting major combat operations. The PLA believes that airfields and ports have poor layouts and throughput capacity, with inadequate support facilities for new weapons and equipment.
In 2017, PLA experts concluded that only 55 percent of the airfields had special railway lines for replenishment of oil, ammunition, and other materiel. The PLA believes many navy ports do not have the capability to support multiple ship types and do not meet the needs of high-intensity combat support. Only Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Xiamen, and some other ports in the warzone have the required heavy lifting equipment.
Protection and
camouflage of air and naval facilities is considered poor, with more than 80 percent of the airfield and port facilities exposed above ground. Early warning and special aircraft and missile units are not considered well-protected. Transportation lines in the area of operations are vulnerable, containing many viaducts and tunnels that are easily damaged and difficult to repair.
At this time, PLA logistics capabilities likely cannot support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. The PLA would have to initiate a significant effort to improve the multiple areas limiting logistics support. Depending on the pace and scale of efforts to improve logistics capabilities, the project would likely take at least several years once started. Such a crash effort could provide early indications and warning of an intention to invade Taiwan. Alternatively, if the PLA maintains a slow methodical approach to logistics modernization it could take at least a decade to achieve a capability to logistically support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=cmsi-maritime-reports