Jeffrey Sachs and the Lancet COVID Commission
Holy crap. Jeffrey Sachs blows it open or did he?)
Prof. Jeffrey Sachs is the Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University and the President of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network. He has also served as the chair of the COVID-19 commission for leading medical journal the Lancet. Through his investigations as the head of the COVID-19 commission, Prof. Sachs has come to the conclusion that there is extremely dangerous biotechnology research being kept from public view, that the United States was supporting much of this research, and that it is very possible that SARS-CoV-2, the virus responsible for COVID-19, originated through dangerous virus research gone awry.
Prof. Sachs recently co-authored a paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences calling for an independent inquiry into the virus’s origins. He believes that there is clear proof that the National Institutes of Health and many members of the scientific community have been impeding a serious investigation of the origins of COVID-19 and deflecting attention away from the hypothesis that risky U.S.-supported research may have led to millions of deaths. If that hypothesis is true, the implications would be earth-shaking, because it might mean that esteemed members of the scientific community bore responsibility for a global calamity. In this interview, Prof. Sachs explains how he, as the head of the COVID-19 commission for a leading medical journal, came to the conclusion that powerful actors were preventing a real investigation from taking place.
Sachs
“I chaired the commission for the Lancet for two years on COVID. I’m pretty convinced it came out of U.S. lab biotechnology, not out of nature, just to mention. After two years of intensive work on this. So it’s a blunder in my view of biotech, not an accident of a natural spillover. We don’t know for sure, I should be absolutely clear. But there’s enough evidence that it should be looked into. And it’s not being investigated, not in the United States, not anywhere. And I think for real reasons that they don’t want to look underneath the rug, the statement.”
In May Sachs coauthored this paper in PNAS
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9173817/
Participating US institutions include the EHA, the University of North Carolina (UNC), the University of California at Davis (UCD), the NIH, and the USAID. Under a series of NIH grants and USAID contracts, EHA coordinated the collection of SARS-like bat CoVs from the field in southwest China and southeast Asia, the sequencing of these viruses, the archiving of these sequences (involving UCD), and the analysis and manipulation of these viruses (notably at UNC). A broad spectrum of coronavirus research work was done not only in Wuhan (including groups at Wuhan University and the Wuhan CDC, as well as WIV) but also in the United States.
The exact details of the fieldwork and laboratory work of the EHA-WIV-UNC partnership, and the engagement of other institutions in the United States and China, has not been disclosed for independent analysis. The precise nature of the experiments that were conducted, including the full array of viruses collected from the field and the subsequent sequencing and manipulation of those viruses, remains unknown.
EHA, UNC, NIH, USAID, and other research partners have failed to disclose their activities to the US scientific community and the US public, instead declaring that they were not involved in any experiments that could have resulted in the emergence of SARS-CoV-2. The NIH has specifically stated that there is a significant evolutionary distance between the published viral sequences and that of SARS-CoV-2 and that the pandemic virus could not have resulted from the work sponsored by NIH.
On May 11, 2022, Acting NIH Director Lawrence Tabak testified before Congress that several such sequences in a US database were removed from public view, and that this was done at the request of both Chinese and US investigators.
Blanket denials from the NIH are no longer good enough. Although the NIH and USAID have strenuously resisted full disclosure of the details of the EHA-WIV-UNC work program, several documents leaked to the public or released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) have raised concerns. These research proposals make clear that the EHA-WIV-UNC collaboration was involved in the collection of a large number of so-far undocumented SARS-like viruses and was engaged in their manipulation within biological safety level (BSL)-2 and BSL-3 laboratory facilities, raising concerns that an airborne virus might have infected a laboratory worker
The NIH could say more about the possible role of its grantees in the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, yet the agency has failed to reveal to the public the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a research-associated event, even though several researchers raised that concern on February 1, 2020, in a phone conversation that was documented by email . Those emails were released to the public only through FOIA, and they suggest that the NIH leadership took an early and active role in promoting the “zoonotic hypothesis” and the rejection of the laboratory-associated hypothesis .
The NIH has resisted the release of important evidence, such as the grant proposals and project reports of EHA, and has continued to redact materials released under FOIA, including a remarkable 290-page redaction in a recent FOIA release.
Information now held by the research team headed by EHA , as well as the communications of that research team with US research funding agencies, including NIH, USAID, DARPA, DTRA, and the Department of Homeland Security, could shed considerable light on the experiments undertaken by the US-funded research team and on the possible relationship, if any, between those experiments and the emergence of SARS-CoV-2.
We do not assert that laboratory manipulation was involved in the emergence of SARS-CoV-2, although it is apparent that it could have been. However, we do assert that there has been no independent and transparent scientific scrutiny to date of the full scope of the US-based evidence.
Much vital information still resides in China, in the laboratories, hospital samples, and early epidemiological information not yet available to the scientific community. Yet a US-based investigation need not wait—there is much to learn from the US institutions that were extensively involved in research that may have contributed to, or documented the emergence of, the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
Only an independent and transparent investigation, perhaps as a bipartisan Congressional inquiry, will reveal the information that is needed to enable a thorough scientific process of scrutiny and evaluation.
https://www.unz.com/runz/covid-and-the-political-bankruptcy-of-the-alternative-media/
Yet the likes of Rand Paul wants you to focus only on Fauci and China. Why is that?
Sachs interview with RFK, well worth watching. He explains how has head of the commission he appointed Daszak to head the Origins Task Forced. The commission had 12 different Task Forces He explained how he discovered Daszak was conflicted as well as those members of the group he had assembled so he disbanded it, leaving only 11 Task Forces once he kicked Judas out. How biblical.
https://childrenshealthdefense.org/defender/jeffrey-sachs-fauci-covid-rfk-jr-podcast/
Now before folks start thinking Sachs is some savior, let me explain what I think he was really up to.
First of all, Lancet pretty much discredited itself through the COVID era. Nobody in their right mind will trust any report put out by their Commission.
Second, nothing convincing can come from a group on the Proximity of the Virus since there has been no honest independent investigation and the FOIA Emails show the intent to cover up the real origins. Why not just disband the Task Force, lay all the cards on the table as to what might be the possibilities, and establish some credibility for the report you will be publishing
Third. Sachs himself is a Globalist pushing this Sustainability nonsense, and COVID is a Globalist operation meant to facilitate the Great Reset and Sustainability Goals of Agenda 2030. Be skeptical. The best liars throw out some nuggets of truth to gain credibility
Lancet Covid Commission Report came out September 14,2022.
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2822%2901585-9
What a complete and utter whitewash, and pushing everything that went wrong with COVID as the new normal with nary a concern about vaccine safety
Here is some preamble
The Commissioners oversaw the work of 12 thematic Task Forces, which met on an ongoing basis (once every 2 weeks or once per month) to support the work of the Commission. These Task Forces included a total of 173 experts. The Commission Secretariat acted as liaison among the Task Forces. The Task Forces published short pieces on their respective areas of focus on the Commission website and in peer-reviewed journals, contributing to the efforts of the overall Commission.
New word for me. Prosocialty
Prosociality nowadays includes voluntary behaviours by individuals, such as the proper use of face masks, in addition to government regulations, such as the enforcement of workplace safety standards, to prevent the transmission of disease.
Prosociality generally requires some form of the Golden Rule (doing to others what you would have done to you) or the Kantian Imperative (acting according to maxims that can be universal laws). Pandemics have many strategic dilemmas, and therefore require cooperative responses rather than selfish—and self-defeating—behaviours.
Prosociality was at a low ebb in many societies during the past 2 years. In many countries, social trust in government and other authorities among citizens has declined markedly in the past two decades (and over the past four decades in the United States)—related, at least in part, to the persistent increase in socioeconomic inequalities. In places of low social trust, prosocial behaviours are rejected by many groups within society.
In short, pandemic control is based heavily on prosocial actions by individuals (eg, getting tested, keeping a physical distance, and isolating when infective), and these individual measures rely heavily on public policies (eg, trusted information for the community, access to testing sites, and an economic framework such as guaranteed paid leave) to support self-isolation
Oh Lord. Now lets skip to their summary as to what went wrong
Summary
The multiple failures of international cooperation include (1) the lack of timely notification of the initial outbreak of COVID-19; (2) costly delays in acknowledging the crucial airborne exposure pathway of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and in implementing appropriate measures at national and global levels to slow the spread of the virus; (3) the lack of coordination among countries regarding suppression strategies; (4) the failure of governments to examine evidence and adopt best practices for controlling the pandemic and managing economic and social spillovers from other countries; (5) the shortfall of global funding for low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), as classified by the World Bank; (6) the failure to ensure adequate global supplies and equitable distribution of key commodities—including protective gear, diagnostics, medicines, medical devices, and vaccines—especially for LMICs; (7) the lack of timely, accurate, and systematic data on infections, deaths, viral variants, health system responses, and indirect health consequences; (8) the poor enforcement of appropriate levels of biosafety regulations in the lead-up to the pandemic, raising the possibility of a laboratory-related outbreak; (9) the failure to combat systematic disinformation; and (10) the lack of global and national safety nets to protect populations experiencing vulnerability.
Acknowledging the uncertainties faced by WHO before the event, we list five areas in which WHO was too slow to act after the COVID-19 outbreak: (1) the recognition of asymptomatic human-to-human transmission, (2) the announcement of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, (3) the advice on precautionary approaches to travel, (4) the advice on face masks, and (5) the acknowledgement of the crucial airborne exposure pathway of SARS-CoV-2, and the resulting implementation of appropriate risk reduction measures, such as increased ventilation and enhanced filtration, to slow the spread of the virus.
Oh my, there is just so much they missed
Vaccine Safety
Surveillance of Vaccine Harm
Failure to Investigate and Allow Repurposed Drugs like IVM and HCQ
Failure to Address potential health issues with harms and Efficacy
High Ct threshold established for PCR tests which caused high false positives and needless isolation
Conflating a positive PCR test with COVID disease
Harmful COVID Treatment protocols (respirators, Remdesivir, no or too low dose steroids, overuse of midazolam)
Social and Economic harms of Lockdowns
Masks
Although the wearing of face masks has been widely accepted as a measure to decrease the spread of respiratory illnesses in the Western Pacific region, perhaps because of the experience of these countries with severe acute respiratory syndrome, WHO did not recommend use of face masks by the public until June 5, 2020—nearly 4 months after the declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern. Even then, WHO continued to caution of a lack of evidence that wearing face masks could prevent the spread of COVID-19. Until that point, WHO had advised that face masks should be used only in medical settings and by people who had symptoms of COVID-19.
These delayed and vague recommendations from WHO continued until late April, 2021. One stark example is that even after receiving an open letter from 238 scientists in July, 2020, asking the organisation to address the airborne transmission of COVID-19, WHO did not change its stance on this issue until April 30, 2021.
Early in the outbreak, health authorities concentrated almost exclusively on spray transmission, leading to the emphasis on 1–2 m of physical distancing, extensive and frequent cleaning and disinfection of shared surfaces, and handwashing. Meanwhile, the threat of airborne transmission remained unrecognised and, as a result, the use of face coverings, ventilation, and air filtration as effective risk reduction measures were not adequately encouraged. Incorrect assumptions about airborne transmission persisted in the form of continued misallocation of time, energy, and resources, enabling the virus to continue to spread, almost unabated, for months.
There are three methods of transmission of respiratory infectious diseases. The first and main method is airborne transmission, which occurs through the inhalation of viruses carried in microscopic respiratory particles (≤100 μm in diameter) suspended in the air, known as aerosols.
My head hurts. In Taiwan everyone wears masks yet 25% of the population has had a confirmed infection the last 6 months and it is now climbing again (40k cases a day which is about 600k cases per day when adjusted for US population).
Also they changed the definition of what is an aerosol 100 μm used to be a droplet
[There have been numerous disagreements on the average particle size of droplets and aerosols (Shiu et al., 2019). The World Health Organization (WHO) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) postulate that the particles of more than 5 μm as droplets, and those less than 5 μm as aerosols or droplet nuclei (Siegel et al., 2007; WHO, 2014). Conversely, there have been some other postulations, indicating that aerodynamic diameter of 20 μm or 10 μm or less should be reckoned to be aerosols, based on their ability to linger in the air for a prolonged period, and the reachability to the respirable fraction of the lung (alveolar region) (Gralton et al., 2011; Nicas et al., 2005; Tellier, 2009). Small aerosols are more susceptible to be inhaled deep into the lung, which causes infection in the alveolar tissues of the lower respiratory tract, while large droplets are trapped in the upper airways (Thomas, 2013). ]
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7293495/
The reason they didn’t want to admit the virus spread by aerosols early on is because the case against masks would have been stronger. Masks would have been somewhat effective if the virus only spread by droplets and are mostly useless when spread by aerosols. Now people are so brainwashed they don’t mind admitting its airborne, especially when changing the definition of aerosol
Surprise, surprise. They call for a Global Pandemic Agreement
Establish a global pandemic agreement and strengthen the IHR
The weaknesses and shortfalls of the IHR (2005) in protecting the world against the COVID-19 pandemic
have led to the decision by WHO member states to start the process to draft and negotiate new agreements on
pandemic preparedness and response, including a possible new Pandemic Treaty. We echo many other reports on COVID-19 in calling for a global pandemic agreement and for a reassessment of and update to the IHR (2005).
We recommend the following as some of the core constituents of the new pandemic arrangements. First, bolstered WHO authority, with high-level political support from heads of government in a new Global Health Board.
Second,the right of WHO to investigate in situ any events that could constitute a new global public health emergency.
Third, the creation of a global surveillance and monitoring system for infectious disease outbreaks and transmission, building on existing initiatives—both for disease forecasting and for making informed, data-driven decisions about workplace restrictions, resource allocations, and effective interventions to avoid untargeted, one-size-fits-all restrictions.
Fourth, the approval by WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization of standing regulations regarding the processing and control of international travellers and international freight and shipping under global pandemic conditions.
Finally, the publication of an annual WHO Report on Global Pandemic Preparedness and Response, which should include findings from the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board for review and adoption by the WHA. The WHA should then establish global health policies to address the gaps and weaknesses identified in the report by drawing on the successes of national and regional health strategies and policies, and adapting them to fit various contexts and country needs.
Yawn. Here is what the official report says about the origins. Pretty weak sauce IMO. Still only considering natural and laboratory spill overs and no consideration of intentional release (biological terrorism)
The origins of SARS-CoV-2
The proximal origins of SARS-CoV-2 are still not known. Identifying these origins would provide greater clarity into not only the causes of the current pandemic but also vulnerabilities to future outbreaks and strategies to prevent them.
We concur with the position of 18 leading scientists who wrote in Science magazine44 in May, 2021: “We must take hypotheses about both natural and laboratory spillovers seriously until we have sufficient data.”
As a group of 16 scientists communicated in The Lancet in October, 2021: “Overwhelming evidence for either a zoonotic or research-related origin is lacking: the jury is still out.”
More than 2 years into the pandemic, the search for the origin of SARS-CoV-2 remains incomplete and inconclusive.
Independent experts consulted by the Lancet COVID-19 Commission shared the view that hypotheses about both natural and laboratory spillovers are in play and need further investigation.
Although the proximal origins are unknown, SARS-CoV-2 is thought to derive from a bat SARS-CoV-related coronavirus with a furin cleavage site that enhances the capacity of the virus to infect human cells.
Furin cleavage sites are found naturally in almost every family of coronavirus, although they have not been observed in other SARS-related coronaviruses (subgenus Sarbecoronavirus). Since 2006, following the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome, furin cleavage sites have also been the subject of laboratory manipulation, including their insertion into coronavirus spike proteins. The presence of the furin cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 therefore does not by itself identify the proximal origin of the virus, whether natural or laboratory.
Two main possible pathways of emergence have been identified. The first is that SARS-CoV-2 emerged from a natural spillover event—that is, from a non-research-related zoonotic transmission of the virus from an animal to a human, and thereafter from human to human.
The second is that the virus emerged from research-related activities, with three possible research-related pathways: the infection of a researcher in the field while collecting samples, the infection of a researcher in the laboratory while studying viruses collected in their natural habitat, and the infection of a researcher in the laboratory while studying viruses that have been genetically manipulated. Because both the pathways of natural transmission and of research-related transmission are feasible, preventing the emergence of future pandemic pathogens must include two distinct strategies: the prevention of natural (zoonotic) transmission and the prevention of research-related spillovers. Each of these strategies requires specific actions.
The first pathway of transmission risk is natural spillover. Most epidemics in history have involved the passage of a pathogen from an animal host to humans, followed by human-to-human transmission. For example, the proximal source of SARS-CoV, the virus that led to the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2003–04, was likely to have been exotic animals in a live animal market in Guangdong, China—most probably palm civets (Paguma larvata) and perhaps raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides).
The proximal reservoir of MERS-CoV, the virus that causes Middle East respiratory syndrome, is dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius).
In both cases, bats serve as the primary evolutionary source of the virus. Because both severe acute respiratory syndrome and Middle East respiratory syndrome result from natural spillovers of betacoronaviruses, the outbreaks of these diseases gave rise to concerns that future such spillovers would occur. SARS-CoV-2 might well be such an instance, especially given findings of SARS-CoV-2-like viruses in bats across east Asia.
The dangers of zoonotic spillovers are increased by human encroachments into the habitats of animals that carry novel pathogens, such as through forest clearing, the handling of exotic animals in the illicit trade of wild species, in farms that raise domestic animals, and in food markets that sell and slaughter live animals.
The two subpathways for a natural spillover are direct bat-to-human transmission and transmission from bat to intermediate host to human. It is possible that the virus was passed directly from bats to humans because there are bat coronaviruses that can bind to human angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 and thereby infect humans without adaptation. Bats known to harbour these viruses are present across east Asia, including in central China.
The other natural pathway is transmission from bats to an intermediate host mammal and then to a human. This pathway is plausible because many of the earliest known cases of COVID-19 in humans in Wuhan are associated with the Huanan Seafood Market, and this market sold animals such as raccoon dogs that are known to be susceptible to SARS-related coronaviruses.
However, as no animals in the market tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, it is not known whether the COVID-19 cases associated with this market indicate the actual proximal origin of the virus or a secondary outbreak brought by humans to the marketplace.
Because the first emergence of the virus could well have been in November, 2019, or even earlier, the cases associated with the Huanan Seafood Market in mid-December, 2019, could well indicate a human-to-human amplifier event rather than the original animal-to-human spillover. Despite the testing of more than 80 000 samples from a range of wild and farm animal species in China collected between 2015 and March, 2020, no cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection have been identified.
Because betacoronaviruses related to SARS-CoV-2 are found across east Asia, the search for a natural source of SARS-CoV-2 should continue with high focus and intensity, as the eventual discovery of a natural reservoir of the virus might occur only after years of searching, and quite possibly outside of China.
The second possible pathway is a research-related or laboratory-associated release of the pathogen. Such a pathway could have involved a researcher becoming infected in the field or in the laboratory with a natural virus, or becoming infected in the laboratory with a genetically manipulated virus.
Advances in biotechnology in the past two decades have made it possible to create new and highly dangerous pathogens through genetic manipulation—for example, creating chimeric viruses by combining the genetic material of more than one viral pathogen, or mutant viruses through the deliberate insertion of a furin cleavage site.
The bioengineering of SARS-CoV-like viruses for the study and testing of potential drugs and vaccines advanced substantially after the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome in the 2000s.
Laboratory experiments included the creation of novel viruses (eg, so-called consensus viruses that average the genetic code across a set of natural viruses), the mutation of viruses (such as through the insertion of a furin cleavage site), the creation of chimeric viruses, and the serial passaging of viruses through cell cultures to test their transmissibility, virulence, immunogenicity, and host tropism.
Research that can increase the transmissibility and virulence of pathogens is called gain-of-function research of concern, although which specific experiments should fall into this category is contested by scientists. As laboratory technologies have rapidly advanced, many scientists have warned of the increasing risks of undersupervised and under-regulated genetic manipulation of SARS-CoV-like viruses and other potential pandemic pathogens. There is currently no system for the global monitoring and regulation of gain-of-function research of concern.
As of the time of publication of this report, all three research-associated hypotheses are still plausible: infection in the field, infection with a natural virus in the laboratory, and infection with a manipulated virus in the laboratory.
No independent, transparent, and science-based investigation has been carried out regarding the bioengineering of SARS-like viruses that was underway before the outbreak of COVID-19. The laboratory notebooks, databases, email records, and samples of institutions involved in such research have not been made available to independent researchers. Independent researchers have not yet investigated the US laboratories engaged in the laboratory manipulation of SARS-CoV-like viruses, nor have they investigated the details of the laboratory research that had been underway in Wuhan.
Moreover, the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) has resisted disclosing details of the research on SARS-CoV-related viruses that it had been supporting,providing extensively redacted information only as required by Freedom of Information Act lawsuits.
In brief, there are many potential proximal origins of SARS-CoV-2, but there is still a shortfall of independent, scientific, and collaborative work on the issue. The search for the origins of the virus requires unbiased, independent, transparent, and rigorous work by international teams in the fields of virology, epidemiology, bioinformatics, and other related fields, and supported by all governments.
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)01585-9/fulltext